One of the main criticisms of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has been that it is deficient at identifying and correcting the wrongful convictions of the factually innocent. These criticisms stem from the Court's perceived difficulties in relation to appeals based on factual error. The main ground of appeal for errors of fact is fresh evidence and these appeals are particularly problematic because they require the Court to trespass on the role of the jury somewhat in assessing new evidence on appeal against the evidence at trial in order to determine whether the conviction is unsafe. The broad consensus is that the Court's difficulties are caused by three main issues: its deference to the jury verdict; its reverence for the principle of finality; and the lack of resources to deal with huge numbers appealing. There is less agreement in identifying the source of the problems because it is not clear whether they derive from legislative powers or the interpretation of those powers by the judiciary. This article uses both qualitative and quantitative empirical research in order to try to determine what the Court's approach is in fresh evidence appeals and, if there are problems, whether it is the law or the interpretation of the law by the judiciary which is to blame. It also proposes reforms designed to make it easier for the Court to rectify miscarriages of justice.
Introduction
One of the consistent criticisms of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has been that it is deficient at rectifying the wrongful convictions of the factually innocent. 1 The role of the Court of Appeal is not to declare people innocent as the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 (amending the Criminal Appeal Act 1968) gives the Court of Appeal the power to quash a conviction if it thinks it is 'unsafe.' 2 There are two interpretations of 'unsafe,' and one interpretation has applied to a factually innocent person who has been, or may be, wrongfully convicted. 3 There are various judgments where the Court has expressed a view that it felt that an innocent person had been wrongly convicted, or at the very least that an injustice had occurred, 4 but as this is not part of its legally defined role these pronouncements are rare. There is a presumption of innocence in the English and Welsh legal system, 5 but this is a technical term which requires the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; if the prosecution case fails, the defendant is legally but not necessarily factually innocent. 6 The main criticisms of the Court stem from its perceived difficulties in relation to appeals based on factual error. The main ground of appeal for errors of fact is fresh evidence and these appeals are particularly problematic because they require the Court to trespass on the fact-finding role of the jury somewhat in assessing new evidence on appeal against the evidence presented at trial in order to determine whether the conviction is unsafe. 7 There appears to be a broad consensus that the Court's problems in determining [1998] EWCA Crim 998. 5 This is also enshrined in Article 6(2) of the ECHR: 'everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.' 6 See Michael Zander: 'The presumption of innocence exists quite independently of whether the defendant is innocent or guilty, and indeed has nothing to do with the question of guilt or otherwise.' The Times, 20 August 1994. 7 Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s.1(1). The Court of Appeal (a) shall allow an appeal against conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case." factual error appeals are caused by too much deference being shown to the jury verdict, 8 undue reverence to the principle of finality, 9 and a lack of resources that has led to the fear that the floodgates would open and there would be a deluge of applications to appeal which the Court could not cope with. 10 Whilst there appears to be a consensus on the problems, the difficulty is identifying the source of the problems because it is not clear whether they derive from the legislative powers the judiciary have been given or their interpretation of those powers.
As a result of the Court's problems in determining factual error appeals, in common with other legal jurisdictions, this has meant that it is far easier to succeed on an appeal based on procedural irregularity in England and Wales than it is for an appeal based on fresh evidence. 11 This explains why more appeals are brought on the basis of irregularities and why more convictions are quashed on that basis. This is also explained by there being a twenty-eight day time limit after conviction to lodge a 'notice of an application for leave to appeal' which can be extended at the discretion of the Court of Appeal, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar. 12 It is very difficult to find fresh evidence in twenty-eight days so the appellant's grounds of appeal at first instance tend to be those alleging procedural errors.
This succeeds in reinforcing the importance of procedural irregularities on appeal and downplays arguments of factual error. In applications relying purely on a claim of factual innocence there may be little on which to progress the case if there are no legal or procedural arguments or they have been argued and the appeal has failed. The difficulty then arises of the defendant having to locate fresh evidence in order to succeed on appeal.
In most cases, the appellant will have to apply to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) to refer the case back to the Court of Appeal which is not an easy task. it seeks to determine whether it is the wording of the law or the interpretation of the law by the judiciary which is to blame. In order to place the empirical research in context, it is necessary to outline the law and historical approaches to fresh evidence appeals. 17 The main opponents to reform at the time proved to be the judiciary with various reports from the period revealing that the judges were not opposed to a criminal appeal system as such, as the judiciary did not object to their decisions being reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of law, but were clearly very hostile to an appeal system based on errors of fact. 18 The reasons given by the judges were to resonate through the history of criminal appeals and can be summed up as follows: they did not believe that innocent people were convicted; 19 they felt that it would lessen the responsibility felt by jurors who would be less reluctant to convict on doubtful evidence if they knew the decision could be appealed; 20 they felt a right of appeal would lessen the deterrent effect of review a conviction (s.9(1)); a sentence other than one fixed by law (s.9(3)); a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (s.9(5)); or a finding that a person under a disability did the act or omission charged against him (s.9(6)). Once the reference has been made it is treated as a normal appeal and leave is not required on the grounds referred but it will be required on any additional ones (s.315 Criminal Justice Act 2003). To refer a case, the CCRC is given statutory guidance under s.13, which states that there must be a "real possibility" arising from an argument or evidence that was not raised during the trial or at appeal, or from "exceptional circumstances" that the conviction or sentence would not be upheld. For an analysis of fresh evidence appeals and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, see S. Roberts and L. Weathered, above n. 1. 14 See, Pattenden, above n.1; Nobles and Schiff, above n.1; McCartney and Roberts, above n. the criminal law; 21 and they felt that there were insufficient numbers of judges to handle the anticipated volume of appeals.
Historical approaches to fresh evidence appeals
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In the absence of an appeal system for errors of fact, the prerogative of mercy was the mechanism for rectifying miscarriages of justice. The Home Secretary could grant a free pardon which was a declaration of innocence. 23 One of the reasons it took so long to establish the Court was that it was felt it was not needed as long as the Home Secretary had this power to remedy injustice. However, the cases of Adolf Beck and George Edalji revealed the deficiencies in the procedure when the Home Office rejected sixteen attempts by Beck to have his conviction reviewed. This case, and others, 24 showed that a criminal appeal system based on errors of fact was urgently needed.
The Court was originally given wide powers under section 9 of the CAA 1907 to admit evidence on appeal 25 but the judges chose to interpret those powers narrowly and imposed hurdles from the civil law such as: that evidence had to be credible and relevant to the issue of guilt, 26 that the evidence had to be admissible, 27 and that the evidence could not have been put before the jury. 28 The case of R v Parks 29 showed that the Court was initially applying an objective test in deciding fresh evidence appeals by analysing the influence that fresh evidence may have had on the original jury, or a reasonable jury but obviously without having heard the evidence itself. Lord Parker CJ alluded to why the Court would take a restrictive approach to fresh evidence appeals, 'it is only rarely that this court allows further evidence to be called, and it is quite clear that the principles upon which this court acts must 21 Ibid. (Baron Parke at 8; Lord Brougham at 49). 22 Ibid. (Baron Parke at 5; Baron Alderson at 10; Lord Brougham at 8). 23 A free pardon releases a person from the effect of a penalty or a consequence of a sentence though quashing the conviction can only be done by the Court of Appeal. The grant of a free pardon is restricted to cases where it is impractical for the case to be referred to an appellate court and secondly, where new evidence has arisen that has not been before the courts, demonstrating beyond any doubt either that no offence was committed or that the defendant did not commit the crime. [1908] 2 Cr App R 27. These principles were summarised by Lord Parker LCJ in R v Parks in 1962 'First, the evidence that it is sought to call must be evidence which was not available at the trial. Secondly, and this goes without saying, it must be evidence relevant to the issues. Thirdly, it must be evidence that is credible evidence in the sense that it is well capable of belief. Fourthly, the court will, after considering that evidence, go on to consider whether there might have been a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the appellant if that evidence had been given together with the other evidence at the trial.' [1962] 46 Cr App R 29. 29 Ibid. be kept within narrow confines, otherwise in every case this court would be in effect asked to effect a new trial.' 30 As the Court is a review Court it does not have the power to rehear the case. Therefore, Lord Parker was correct in that it cannot perform a retrial with the new evidence. In 1952, the Tucker Committee was set up to review the issue of retrials. 35 The
Committee was unanimous in proposing that the Court should be given the power to order a retrial in cases which involved fresh evidence but this was not implemented until ten years after it reported. This was possibly due to the lack of public interest as public pressure is usually the catalyst for reforming the appeal process. Indeed, it was the high profile case of Without prejudice to the generality of s.9 of the 1907 Act, where evidence is tendered to the Court of Appeal under that section, the Court shall, unless they are satisfied that the evidence if received would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal, exercise their power under that section of receiving it if (a) it appears to them that the evidence is likely to be credible and would have been admissible at the trial on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (b) they are satisfied that it was not adduced at the trial, but that there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it.
The new section altered existing practice in two ways. First, it imposed a duty on the court to receive fresh evidence where formerly there was a discretion. Second, it need no longer be shown that the evidence was not available at the trial but simply that there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it. The clear intention of Parliament was to liberalise the test. It is clear that a more liberal attitude than hitherto prevailed was introduced by the provision in section 5 [of the 1966 Act] that the fresh evidence sought to be introduced shall be received unless the court is satisfied upon the grounds specified in the section that it ought to be. Nevertheless, public mischief would ensue and the legal process could become indefinitely prolonged were it the case that evidence produced at any time will generally be admitted by this Court when verdicts are being reviewed. There must be some curbs, the section specifies them, and we proceed to consider the present applications with due regard to them.
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This case made it clear that the Court saw its role as reviewing verdicts, not to rehear cases which illustrates why fresh evidence cases are treated with such caution. This also showed how important the principle of finality was to judicial decision-making. After a failed attempt to quash the conviction at the Court of Appeal, this case eventually went to the House of Lords on a point of law which clarified the Court's approach to its new fresh evidence powers. 53 The Court rejected the previous objective test of whether the original jury might have been influenced by the fresh evidence and adopted a new subjective approach. The test to be applied was set out by Viscount Dilhorne:
The court has to decide whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory and no different question has to be decided when the court allows fresh evidence to be called……Parliament has, in terms, said that the court should only quash a conviction if, there being no error of law or material irregularity at the trial, 'they think' the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory. They have to decide and Parliament has not required them power to quash a verdict if they think that a jury might conceivably reach a different conclusion from that to which they have come. If the court has no reasonable doubt about the verdict, it follows that the court does not think that the jury could have one. The Stafford judgment has been the subject of much criticism, 55 most notably from the former Law Lord, Lord Devlin, who criticised the approach of the judges on the grounds that the accused now had a mixed trial by judges and jury. He stated:
They [the judges] did not hear the old witnesses and there are no specific findings about them to be found in the general verdict. So the judges have to decide upon their reliability on the record, fortified by conjectures from the verdict; to reach their verdict, the judges would say, the jury must have believed this or that. In assessing the reliability of the new witnesses…the judges are on their own.
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Lord Devlin went on to say:
It seems to me that even those judges who are in favour of extending the domain of the judges over the facts must accept that the position which has now been reached is not a satisfactory one. Instead of the re-trial by jury for which Parliament provided in 1964, there is an imperfect re-trial by judges, in which the normal appellate review has been swallowed up…..I do not think that in 1964 Parliament would have taken kindly to a trial by judges alone in fresh evidence cases.
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Lord Devlin felt that most cases involving fresh evidence should be sent for retrial before a fresh jury as anything less was a denial of the appellant's constitutional right to trial by jury.
Pattenden's view is that Lord Devlin's criticism is based on a crucial assumption that the right to trial by jury persists after a trial has already taken place; the counter view is that a defendant's right to trial by jury is fully satisfied by the original trial. Although the Court may test its views by asking itself what the original jury might have concluded, the question which in the end we have to decide is whether in our judgment, in all the circumstances of the case including both the verdict of the jury at trial upon the evidence they heard, the convictions were safe and satisfactory. A major review of fresh evidence appeals was conducted by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) in 1993. 63 The RCCJ concluded that the Court's powers under section 23 were adequate but were perhaps being construed too narrowly. The Commission stated it thought it understandable that the Court would view fresh evidence with some suspicion and the Court was right not to wish to encourage defendants to think of the Crown Court trial as a 'practice run'. On the other hand, the Court must be alive to the possibility that the fresh evidence may exonerate the appellant or at least throw serious doubt on the conviction. 64 The Commission stated that it had been suggested in evidence to them that the Court took an excessively restrictive approach to whether the fresh evidence had been available at the trial and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to There is clearly a consensus that what is considered as fresh evidence should no longer be subject to the restrictive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the past. Our view is that although the Court is entitled to seek and take account of any explanation why evidence which was available was not adduced at the trial, this should not be the determining factor; the test must be a broad one of whether the evidence goes to the safety of the conviction. Virtually by definition, the decision whether to admit fresh evidence is case and fact specific. The discretion to receive fresh evidence is a wide one focussing on the interests of justice. The considerations listed in subsection (2)(a) to (d) are neither exhaustive nor conclusive, but they require specific attention. The fact that the issue to which the fresh evidence relates was not raised at trial does not automatically preclude its reception. However it is well understood that, save exceptionally, if the defendant is allowed to advance on appeal a defence and/or evidence which could and should have been but were not put before the jury, our trial process would be subverted. Therefore if they were not deployed when they were available to be deployed, or the issues could have been but were not raised at trial, it is clear from the statutory structure, as explained in the authorities, that unless a reasonable and persuasive explanation for one or other of these omissions is offered, it is highly unlikely that the "interests of justice" test will be satisfied.'
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How this works in practice will be discussed using empirical research below. A major development in recent years which may have had an impact on the working practices of the Court in fresh evidence appeals is the case of R v Pendleton 77 and it is necessary to outline the development of this judgment before discussing the empirical research.
Pendleton and the Court's decision-making process
As discussed above, initially the Court applied the objective jury impact test in determining the appeal but the House of Lords in Stafford decided the test should be more subjective. We have…..concluded that the conviction is unsafe because we cannot be sure that the jury would have reached the same conclusion that they were sure of guilt if they had the fresh evidence we have heard. Furthermore the case as presented to us by both sides is very different to that presented at trial. The Court of Appeal can make its assessment of the fresh evidence it has heard, but save in a clear case it is at a disadvantage in seeking to relate that evidence to the rest of the evidence which the jury heard. For these reasons it will usually be wise for the Court of Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, to test their own provisional view by asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict. If it might, the conviction must be thought to be unsafe.
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Donald Pendleton's appeal was allowed on the basis that the Court of Appeal had failed to appreciate that the importance of the fresh evidence was such that it would have led to the trial being conducted completely differently:
Had the jury been trying a different case on substantially different evidence the outcome must be in doubt. In holding otherwise the Court of Appeal strayed beyond its true function of review and made findings that were not open to it in all the circumstances. Indeed it came perilously close to considering whether the appellant, in its judgment, was guilty. the Court appeared to make its own evaluation of the fresh evidence and upheld the appeals. In R v Hakala, one of the reasons given for the reinforcement of the Stafford approach was that:
The judgment in "fresh evidence" cases will inevitably therefore continue to focus on the facts before the trial jury, in order to ensure that the right question -the safety, or otherwise, of the conviction -is answered. It is integral to the process that if the fresh evidence is disputed, this court must decide whether and to what extent it should be accepted or rejected, and if it is to be accepted, to evaluate its importance, or otherwise, relative to the remaining material which was before the trial jury: hence the jury impact test. Indeed, although the question did not arise in Pendleton, the fresh evidence adduced by the appellant, or indeed the Crown, may serve to confirm rather than undermine the safety of the conviction. Unless this evaluation is carried out, it is difficult to see how this court can perform out its statutory responsibility in a fresh evidence case, and exercise its "power of review to guard against the possibility of injustice". However the safety of the appellant's convictions is examined, the essential question, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in the light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe. 91 The Stafford approach was reinforced in the judgment of R v Ahmed. 92 In that case, Mantell
LJ referred to the case of R v Hakala and also R v Hanratty which had both approved
Stafford and cited with approval the speech from Judge LJ in R v Hakala above. He stated as is shown in Pendleton and Hakala it is for this Court to decide whether or not the evidence should be accepted. If it is accepted, the question is then as to its impact on the safety of the conviction.
The Privy Council had the opportunity to review R v Pendleton in Dial and Dottin v The
State. 94 This was a death row case from Trinidad and Tobago. There was undisputed information that an identification witness had lied at trial. The majority (three-two) dismissed the appeal and Lord Bingham was in the majority. Lord Brown outlined the approach to use when determining fresh evidence appeals. He stated:
In the Board's view the law is now clearly established and can be simply stated as follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the Court of Appeal, assuming always that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in the context of the remainder of the evidence in the case. If the court concludes that the fresh evidence raises no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused it will dismiss the appeal. The responsibility for deciding whether fresh material renders a conviction unsafe is laid inescapably on this court, which must make up its own mind. Of course it must consider the nature of the issue before the jury and such information as it can gather as to the reasoning process through which the jury will have been passing. It is likely to ask itself by way of check what impact the fresh material might have had on the jury. But in most cases of arguably relevant fresh evidence it will be impossible to be 100% sure that it might not possibly have had some impact on the jury's deliberations, since ex hypothesi the jury has not seen the fresh material. 106 This may seem to be the prevailing approach, but despite these authorities, the jury impact test is still being used in some cases.
Jury impact test
There are a number of cases where the Court used the jury impact test to quash the conviction. 107 The Court's consistent claim that it decides whether the conviction is unsafe and not whether the appellant is guilty gives rise to a number of judgments where the Court says it cannot speculate on the decision-making process of the jury at trial. It then appears to do just that when deciding that the new evidence may have had an impact on their decision at trial. It is not entirely clear how the Court is able to decide whether the fresh evidence may have had an impact on the jury without trying to ascertain why they made the decisions they did with the evidence they heard and how this new evidence would have influenced that decision. A useful case in this respect is R v A, 108 where the appellant was convicted of rape and the fresh evidence the Court heard was three witnesses casting doubt on the complainant's story. Counsel for the prosecution then sought leave to call the complainant and the Court refused with Laws LJ stating:
We acknowledge that there are cases in which the court has received evidence adduced by the Crown to rebut fresh evidence called for an appellant. They include instances where objective scientific material is available which refutes the new testimony, or may do so. This case is in a different category. We would have been invited to measure the complainant's credibility against that of the new witnesses for the appellant. That is very close to the trial process itself, given the nature of the three issues in the appeal and the fact that the complainant's credibility was at the heart of the case. We should be trespassing onto the proper territory of the jury. In those circumstances we declined, as we have said, to receive evidence from the complainant.
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The Court quashed the conviction seemingly accepting that the evidence from the witnesses showed the complainant had admitted to lying. It is difficult to see how this is not the Court usurping the role of the jury.
There are also examples of the jury impact test being used to uphold the appeal. evidence. This is to some extent inevitable in these appeals as the Court is deciding on evidence that was never before the jury. The Court is unable to order a retrial until it has quashed the conviction so it still has to choose which approach to take if it wishes to order a retrial. The findings from the empirical evidence will now be discussed.
Empirical research
As the previous discussion shows, the Court's approach to these appeals has largely been described as restrictive, though it has occasionally been acknowledged as taking a more liberal approach. The difficulty is that without a normative baseline with which to measure the Court's approach it can be difficult to determine whether the Court is taking a restrictive or a liberal approach. With that in mind, the judgments in this article are analysed in terms of whether it is possible to indicate whether the Court is being restrictive or liberal. Before the current sample of judgments is discussed, it is necessary to outline the quantitative findings from the last major empirical study on fresh evidence appeals to place the current sample in database were not available as they were subject to reporting restrictions so where this occurred the next transcript was accessed. 114 The appeals reviewed covered the period from January to July 2016. The same methodology as Malleson was adopted in order to provide a comparison.
This study has not sought to determine in any reliable statistical terms, whether the CAA 1995 had changed the way in which the Court makes its decision as compared with 
The 1990 and 2016 samples of judgments
Malleson had a total of twenty-three cases in her sample in which fresh evidence was raised (eight per cent of the total appeals). Four out of the twenty-three cases involved expert or forensic evidence and sixteen involved witnesses of fact with two in the 'other' category. See table below.
114 The cases subject to reporting restrictions tend to be those where children are involved but there is no information on them on Casetrack so it is impossible to give any details of what they are. They will include sentence appeals, appeals against conviction and renewed applications to appeal. In fourteen of the twenty-three cases the evidence was admitted by the Court (sixty-one per cent). Of these, Malleson states four were allowed and two were adjourned for a full hearing The first thing to note is that there were far more appeals based on fresh evidence in 2016 than in 1990 with twenty-three in 1990 and forty-two in 2016. This is potentially evidence of a more liberal approach in 2016 as it could be suggested a greater number of fresh evidence appeals are getting through the leave filter. However, the majority of fresh evidence appeals in the 2016 sample were renewed applications to appeal having initially being rejected by the single judge and therefore, were still seeking leave to appeal. 117 The evidence was admitted by the Court in eight of the forty-two cases (nineteen per cent) in 2016 which is significantly lower than sixty-one per cent in 1990. This is potentially evidence that the Court is now more restrictive than it was in 1990 and twenty of the appeals in 2016 were non-counsel applications and in many of those the applicant had drafted his/her own grounds of appeal.
Malleson conducted a separate study on counsel and non-counsel appeals and her conclusions were that counsel-renewed applications had a substantially higher success rate than non-counsel applications which may account for the low figure of fresh evidence admitted.
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Of the eight appeals where the fresh evidence was admitted in 2016, one was allowed and seven were dismissed. In two cases, a retrial was ordered. Therefore, the number of appeals which succeeded on the basis of fresh evidence in 2016 was very small being two per cent of the total fresh evidence cases and 0.3 per cent of all 300 cases 117 Malleson only makes reference to two of her sample being renewed applications to appeal so if this is the case there was a significant increase in these appeals in the 2016 sample. 118 Above n.8 at 35. Applications for leave to appeal lodged by applicants acting in person have increased markedly this year and now stand at approximately 9.21%. Those numbers are now very significant and it looks as if the percentage will be over 10% next year. There is a price to be paid for this because the case management of cases place a much greater demand on the resources of my Office, in terms both of advice to applicants and support to the judiciary.
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As a result of the rise in non-counsel applications, the Court has introduced a new procedure whereby all grounds by applicants in person are reviewed by lawyers and a summary prepared before the permission stage to ensure that genuine grounds are identified at an early stage.
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Fresh evidence appeals are the most problematic for lawyers because it may take years to find new evidence and, as this and other research shows, it is very difficult to succeed with these appeals. It is even more difficult to succeed if the applicant is drafting his/her own grounds and the increase in these appeals is a worrying development, particularly if innocent people are languishing in prison because they are unable to get legal representation and navigate the difficulties of the appellate process.
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Qualitative findings
The qualitative findings fall into three categories in the 2016 sample, first, the decisions that not refer to it directly but use the terminology from it, and third, those who do not refer to it at all. These approaches are discussed in turn.
There were sixteen cases in the sample where section 23 was directly mentioned.
Three of these were allowed and there were two retrials ordered. contains a much broader discretion to admit evidence.
It would also appear from these judgments that the condition in section 23(2) which causes the most difficulty is section 23(2)(d) and the reasonable explanation for not adducing the evidence at trial. The Court is reluctant to admit any evidence available at trial and its attitude is one of suspicion if it was available but not used with mention of 'tactical games' in the judgments. 151 This is harsh on the applicant if his/her own lawyers made an error but it is not surprising given the Court's reverence for the principle of finality, and its review function which hamper its ability to investigate and rectify errors of fact.
There were fifteen cases in the sample where neither section 23 nor the wording of section 23 was used to determine the appeal. Ten of these cases were non-counsel grounds and therefore it was understandable if the applicant was not using this terminology when drafting his/her own grounds, though the judges should be familiar with this terminology. The main reasons for rejection in these cases were that the evidence was not fresh; there was no merit in it; it was not relevant to anything, or it was unclear what the appellant was referring to. 152 These cases highlight the importance of having legal representation because they can be difficult to understand and are dealt with very briefly by the Court compared to those with legal representation, though having legal representation does not always assist the appellant as the interesting case of R v Aboulkadir, 153 shows. This case was a referral from the CCRC.
Aboulkadir was convicted of sexual offences and his defence was that he had never had any sexual activity with the complainant. The CCRC had obtained fresh expert scientific evidence which showed that the appellant had indeed had sexual activity with the complainant. The appellant's lawyer had been instructed by his client to maintain that he had not had sexual activity at the appeal and the CCRC had referred on the basis that he did In terms of the Court's decision-making process, the majority of the appeals were renewed applications to appeal and therefore the Court itself was making the determination of whether the evidence should be admitted as that is its task on these applications. This is If the court was persuaded to receive the evidence we were invited to find that had it been given at trial it might reasonably have affected the decision of the jury to The Court went on to quash the conviction with no reference to the jury so using the Stafford approach. A much larger sample of fresh evidence appeals would be required to determine how Pendleton works in practice and whether the jury impact test does provide a more liberal approach to determining the appeal.
Conclusion
157 See above n. 133.
It is difficult not to come to the same conclusion that Kate Malleson did twenty-seven years ago:
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data show that fresh evidence cases are rare and treated with great caution by the Court. Only in very limited circumstances will such evidence be admitted and if admitted, form the basis of a successful appeal. Moreover, the Court rarely sets out the reasoning behind its decisions about fresh evidence so that it is hard to discern in any detail what the Court's approach is to this category of appeal.
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The rise in the number of fresh evidence appeals in 2016 may be evidence of a more liberal approach but the majority of these were renewed applications to appeal and this is easily explained by the rise of these generally as stated in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Annual Report mentioned above. The Court's approach still appears to be driven by its deference to the jury verdict and its reverence for the principle of finality. Even the most ardent miscarriages of justice campaigners have recognised the need for finality in the criminal justice process. For example, the campaigning journalist Bob Woffenden recognises the need for finality to avoid criminal justice deteriorating into a process in which repeated tribunals reassess the same issues which he admits would be 'self-defeating, impractical, and also absurdly expensive.' 169 He accepts the fear that an appellate body that failed to place restrictions on the cases it was willing to reassess would be overwhelmed. He also sees the danger that defence lawyers would treat a trial as a mere rehearsal of their 'full'
case. But he then goes on to say that it is 'nevertheless unpardonable that appeal judges have allowed such considerations an overriding importance, with the result that the channels of judicial review have effectively been sealed.' 170 A second campaigning journalist, Peter Hill also recognised that 'the reputation of any legal system depends on its ability to produce finality.' 171 However, he also stated that the Court has relied largely on its authority to produce finality, rather than the wisdom of its judgments. Hill states that to achieve finality there must be a more serious and thorough reinvestigation than cases are thoroughly subjected to, coupled with a change of attitude towards the trial process; he says that finality in some cases may have to be the result of a longer process than a simple trial and 'inevitably such a process will need to be more inquisitorial than adversarial.' The large numbers applying to the CCRC would seem to suggest that the Court is not particularly effective at promoting finality as these are cases that have largely been through the appeal process and failed. Therefore, whilst the Court may assume that its approach is conducive to promoting finality, the difficulties of its decision-making process may actually prolong the process for many appellants who have to keep returning to the Court before they finally succeed in overturning the conviction.
The Court's review function and decision-making process can also contribute to a restrictive approach. If the reviewing of the conviction merely requires the Court to decide if there is evidence the jury could have convicted on, then fresh evidence appeals are at odds with this function. If new evidence was freely admitted on appeal then this would be straying into retrial territory which, as the Donovan Committee stated, was 'a function which Parliament did not intend it to discharge, and for which it is in any event inadequately equipped.' This prevents the Court looking into the merits of the case as it focuses on whether the jury could have convicted and not whether the jury should have convicted. This is most apparent in fresh evidence cases because the appellant is usually arguing there was a factual error in the sense that he/she did not commit the crime so an unsafe fresh evidence conviction is one more likely to be assumed to be factual innocence if overturned. That is not to say that the appellant is factually innocent in all fresh evidence appeals but if he/she is factually innocent then fresh evidence appeals are more likely to be the appeals that reflect this.
A more interventionist approach may be required with more use of the power of the Court to hear the evidence de bene esse. This would mean the appellant not having the restriction of section 23 when deciding whether to admit the evidence and the Court perhaps being more persuaded by oral evidence than evidence given on paper. It is not clear from the judgments if this will be allowed so allowing this as a matter of procedure may improve fresh evidence appeals. The Court is clearly using the conditions in section 23(2) to admit the evidence rather than the broader condition in section 23(1) of in the interests of justice so abolishing section 23(2) may liberate fresh evidence appeals as this would require the Court to focus on the interests of justice rather than the restrictions when deciding to admit it. A further solution may be to give the Court the power to order a retrial or to quash the conviction as, at the moment, the Court has to quash before it can discuss the possibility for retrial. If the Court had the option of ordering a retrial or quashing the conviction this may benefit the appellant who currently has the conviction upheld because a retrial cannot be considered until the decision is made to quash the conviction. The Court may be more inclined to order a retrial if it does not have the hurdle of deciding to quash the conviction first.
The Court was given wide powers under section 9 of the CAA 1907 to adduce evidence on appeal and it created its own restrictions so it would appear that initially it was the attitude of the judiciary that led to the problems. However, legislation then encapsulated those restrictions in section 23(2) which are now being used to limit the wide discretion the Court has under section 23(1) to admit evidence which was the fear of those who criticised section 23 when it was enacted. Abolishing section 23(2) may solve this problem but not if the Court just imposes its own restrictions again through case law. Perhaps a more fundamental change is required to liberate fresh evidence appeals. It may now be time for a thorough review of the Court's function as a court of review to remedy injustice so the Court's powers are not continually changed with the hope of liberalising its approach only to be revisited when another crisis in criminal appeals appears in the future.
